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Web Filtering  
and Censoring
I
n May 2009, the Chinese 
government mandated instal-
lation of the Green Dam Youth 
Escort Web filter on all PCs 
sold in China starting in July. The !l-
ter’s of!cial purpose was to protect 
children from pornographic, violent, 
and other “unhealthy” websites, but 
it immediately aroused opposition 
from several quarters. 
International security researchers 
argued that the !lter was inaccurate 
and contained vulnerabilities poten-
tially exposing PCs to security threats. 
Free speech advocates expressed 
concern that the government could 
use the !lter to monitor users’ online 
activities and block politically sensi-
tive websites. And the US government 
urged the Chinese Ministry of Indus-
try and Information Technology and 
Ministry of Commerce to revoke the 
Green Dam requirement on the basis 
of free trade. 
In response to the controversy, 
the Chinese government inde!nitely 
“delayed” the requirement except for 
PCs used in schools, cyber cafes, and 
other public access locations.
Around the same time, follow-
ing the controversial reelection of 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
in Iran, critics accused the regime 
of blocking certain websites such as 
Facebook and YouTube—which had 
been used to post confrontations with 
the police—as well as sites af!liated 
with the opposition leader. The Ira-
nian government was also suspected 
of monitoring Internet usage to track 
down election protesters.
In January 2010, public attention 
was again drawn to the issue of Web 
censoring when Google.cn decided 
to stop complying with Chinese gov-
ernment requirements to censor 
search results related to politically 
and socially sensitive issues. Google 
reached its decision, considered long 
overdue by some, in response to 
attacks by Chinese hackers on Gmail 
accounts of Chinese human rights 
activists during the previous month. 
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
publicly praised Google and called 
for a global end to Web censoring, 
prompting a critical response from 
the Chinese government.
As a mass medium, the Web is 
unique. Traditional print media such 
as books and newspapers require 
time to publish and distribute physi-
cally, while electronic mass media, 
namely radio and television, typi-
cally depend on of!cial licenses for 
operation and are either state-regu-
lated or self-censored in exchange 
for fewer regulations. In contrast, 
the Web lets individuals easily pub-
lish a rich range of content—such as 
multimedia, hyperlinks, and Java-
Script—globally in real time to PCs 
and various mobile devices.
The public perceives the Web as 
a wildly uncensored medium, the 
embodiment of complete freedom 
of expression (for good or bad). In 
reality, information on the Web is 
not as uncontrolled as it may appear. 
According to the OpenNet Initiative 
(www.opennet.net), more than 40 
countries actively !lter Web access—
selectively blocking content to a 
billion Internet users worldwide—and 
many others are considering doing so. 
These countries use various methods 
to apply different levels of !ltering.    
HOW WEB FILTERING WORKS
Web filters differ in complexity, 
granularity, accuracy, location, and 
transparency. Generally, simpler 
Web !lters are easy to implement but 
work at a coarser granularity. Just as 
importantly, motivated individuals 
tend to discover and circumvent them 
more readily.
IP and URL blacklists
The simplest Web !lters depend on 
blacklists of IP addresses. The main 
advantage of blacklists is speed—
essentially a fast table lookup. Speed 
allows Web !ltering at “choke points” 
in the network where traf!c is aggre-
gated such as gateways between 
neighboring national networks. How-
ever, the simplicity of blacklists has 
two major drawbacks. First, continual 
blacklist updating requires enormous 
effort and resources. Second, IP 
blacklists work at a coarse granular-
ity—the !lter either blocks or allows 
all Web content from an IP address.
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Information on the Web is not as uncontrolled as it may appear.
Figure 1. Green Dam Web !lter. (a) Users or network administrators can choose 
to block or admit access to !ve categories of Web content. Source: University of 
Michigan. (b) Green Dam’s image scanner relies on skin color and face recognition to 
block access to pornographic websites.
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URL blacklists offer a !ner level of 
granularity. These are often imple-
mented at DNS servers that resolve 
domain names to IP addresses. When 
a DNS server receives a resolution 
request, it checks the URL against the 
blacklist. If the requested URL is on 
the list, the DNS server will return an 
incorrect or default IP address. URL 
blacklists suffer the same drawback as 
IP blacklists—maintaining and updat-
ing them requires considerable effort.
IP and URL blacklists can be 
deployed at proxy-based filters. 
Organizations commonly use proxy 
servers to cache Web content locally: 
The proxy cache keeps recently 
requested content, and if users 
request the same content again, it is 
served from the proxy instead of the 
origin server. Because all Web content 
goes through the proxy server, it is an 
attractive location for !ltering.
A proxy-based !lter checks the IP 
addresses or URLs in all Web requests 
against a blacklist. If it detects a 
blacklisted IP address or URL, the 
proxy !lter can return a “blockpage” 
with an error message or explanation 
that the content was blocked. Some 
nations such as China and Iran go 
further and block URLs containing 
prohibited keywords in the URL path. 
However, keywords in the URL do 
not necessarily re"ect the webpage 
contents accurately. For example, the 
word “sex” in a URL would include 
many other types of websites besides 
pornographic ones and blocking 
URLs containing the word would not 
catch all pornographic sites.
Content !ltering
Real-time content filtering at a 
proxy or the Web client offers two 
important advantages over IP or 
URL blacklists. First, the !lter exam-
ines Web contents when a page is 
requested, without the need to prees-
tablish a blacklist. Second, the !ltering 
decision is based on individual web-
pages or even elements within a page.
However, a content filter has 
two difficult and somewhat com-
Figure 1a shows; users or network 
administrators can choose to block 
or admit access to each category. 
Speed is important because people 
become impatient and leave a web-
site if it returns requested contents 
too slowly.
peting requirements: intelligence 
to recognize an undesirable page 
or content within a page, and fast 
operation. Content !lters typically 
use machine learning or AI tech-
niques to classify webpages into 





To !lter pornography, Green Dam 
includes an image scanner that 
appears to identify regions of skin 
color and inputs the region charac-
teristics—for example, shape—into a 
trained support vector machine (SVM) 
classi!er. An additional step attempts 
to recognize a human face, report-
edly using the open source OpenCV 
image recognition software. If a 
human face is not the primary com-
ponent, the !lter classi!es the image 
as pornographic and blocks the site, 
as Figure 1b shows. 
Considering the algorithm’s heavy 
reliance on skin color and face rec-
ognition, it is not surprising that tests 
of Green Dam have found the porn 
!lter to be fallible, mistakenly !lter-
ing Garfield the cat, Johnny Depp, 
Paris Hilton, and "esh-colored pork.
STATE-SPONSORED  
WEB CENSORING
Given the long history of govern-
ments trying to control traditional 
mass media, state-sponsored Web 
censoring could be expected. How-
ever, its prevalence was unknown 
prior to the OpenNet Initiative.
Filtered content
There is little disagreement that 
certain Web content is harmful and 
should be !ltered, such as fraud, Web 
spam, malware, child pornography, 
and terrorism. State-sponsored Web 
!ltering generally targets four types 
of content: 
t political dissent; 
t social deviance—for example, 
hate speech, pornography, and 
gambling; 
t national security threats—
namely, terrorism; and 
t certain Internet services such as 
anonymizers, blogs, peer-to-peer 
sharing, and social networks.
 Government Web !lters in China 
and Iran are considered to be among 
the strictest, but most countries use 
some form of Web !ltering. Even in 
the US, which is widely believed to 
have the fewest restrictions, Web 
!ltering is common at public Inter-
net access spots such as schools and 
libraries, as well as on private corpo-
rate premises.
Example: China
In 2003, the Chinese Ministry of 
Public Security initiated the Golden 
Shield Project, also called the “Great 
Firewall of China,” a comprehen-
sive network to monitor and control 
access to both domestic and foreign 
websites. All foreign traffic enters 
China at three choke points—interna-
tional gateways or Internet exchange 
points (IXPs): Beijing-Qingdao-Tianjin 
in the north, from Japan; Shanghai 
on the central coast, also from Japan; 
and Guangzhou in the south, from 
Hong Kong. A small amount of traf!c 
also enters by satellite, but satellite 
connections are slow and expensive.
The two main backbone providers, 
China Netcom and China Telecom, 
use IP blocking at the international 
gateways. The backbone providers 
also !lter on the basis of URLs con-
taining certain keywords in the URL 
path. Through DNS tampering, DNS 
queries for these URLs may return a 
“site not found” error.
While most countries depend 
solely on IP or URL !ltering, China 
also exercises content filtering via 
its state-licensed ISPs. Content fil-
ters purchased largely from foreign 
security companies examine packet 
payloads for forbidden content—for 
example, sensitive keywords such 
as “democracy” or “64” (for June 4, 
the day of the Tiananmen Square 
incident in 1989). The !lters may cut 
connections to websites with prohib-
ited contents by means of TCP resets, 
Intelligent content !lters examine 
various elements of a webpage for 
classi!cation, including the metadata, 
links, text, images, and scripts.
Metadata in a Web document’s 
header can reveal information about 
authorship and keywords. 
Linkage analysis is based on “guilt 
by association”; pages are likely to 
be linked to other pages of the same 
type. For example, a news website is 
likely linked to other news sites. A 
page’s links can be quite revealing 
about its subject.
Textual analysis is critical to 
content filters because many web-
pages are mostly text. Content !lters 
typically parse the text, identify key-
words, and apply machine-learning 
techniques to decide on the most 
appropriate category. This approach 
is not perfect without semantic anal-
ysis because it can be difficult to 
understand different contexts—for 
example, whether a page with sexual 
content has educational or porno-
graphic purposes.
Image analysis is vital for clas-
sifying pornographic websites, but 
classification accuracy can be low. 
Image analysis usually looks for 
regions with skin color, but this task 
is complicated by the wide range of 
human skin colors and different light-
ing conditions.
Analysis of active content such 
as JavaScript, VBScript, and ActiveX 
controls is essential to detect and 
filter malicious webpages. In par-
ticular, JavaScript is frequently used 
for phishing and drive-by downloads. 
Unfortunately, heavy obfuscation of 
the code can make it unreadable, in 
which case it may be necessary to 
run the code in a JavaScript inter-
preter and observe its behavior.
Example: Green Dam 
Green Dam is an example of a 
desktop Web filter that uses both 
approaches. It !rst checks a requested 
URL against blacklists and then scans 
text for obscenities and politically 
sensitive phrases.
Most countries use 
some form of Web 
filtering.
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goal is to impose signi!cant obstacles 
on the country’s 350 million Internet 
users to discourage the majority from 
accessing certain foreign websites 
and thereby keep public attention on 
tightly regulated domestic sites. Only 
a small minority have the technical 
know-how to !nd ways around gov-
ernment censorship.
F
or those concerned with the 
prevalence of Web censoring, 
the Herdict Web project (www.
herdict.org) collects reports of websites 
around the world that are inaccessible 
to many people and thus a possible 
sign of censorship. As Thomas Jeffer-
son once wrote, “The price for freedom 
is eternal vigilance.” 
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and then temporarily block further 
connection attempts to the same IP 
address. Prohibited websites within 
China require of!cial registration and 
may be shut down. 
Web filtering is one tool in the 
broader monitoring and censor-
ship program. It is believed that 
the Chinese government employs a 
large cyber police force of mostly 
university students to continually 
inspect websites such as blogs and 
discussion forums. They search for 
prohibited content, especially politi-
cal dissidence; participate in online 
discussions to inf luence public 
opinion; identify and track down 
the authors of subversive content; 
and pressure the public to report 
on individuals engaging in prohib-
ited online activities. A system of 
electronic access cards deployed in 
Internet cafes identi!es users before 
they can go online. Perpetrators are 
subject to fines, job dismissal, or 
imprisonment.
Web censoring in China involves 
an extra twist due to its lack of trans-
parency. In contrast, countries such 
as Saudi Arabia publish their Web 
censoring policy and rationale. A user 
who requests a prohibited website is 
presented with a blockpage explain-
ing that the site is disallowed, as 
Figure 2 shows. Citizens can submit 
requests for URLs to be blocked or 
allowed.
No one is quite certain of the 
extent of Web censoring in China. 
The level of censoring appears to vary 
with political events. Users may see 
connection errors but no blockpages 
with clear explanations. In addition, 
content !lters based on sensitive key-
words may block a webpage one day 
but allow access the next day if the 
page contents have changed. 
Consequently, Chinese users are 
uncertain if a website’s inaccessi-
bility is due to deliberate filtering 
or random congestion in the Inter-
net. This unpredictability actually 
makes Web censoring more effective 
because people cannot learn how 
the !lters are working and thus are 
unsure how to circumvent them. 
FILTER CIRCUMVENTION
Given the Chinese government’s 
effective covert Web censoring 
program, its mandate for the desk-
top Green Dam filter was puzzling. 
Although the !lter would have been 
installed on every PC, it could easily 
be disabled.
Sufficiently motivated individu-
als can circumvent a Web !lter—for 
example, they can bypass a URL 
blacklist by going directly to the serv-
er’s IP address. In the case of China, 
Golden Shield does not attempt to 
read or censor any encrypted traf!c 
such as used in virtual private net-
works (VPNs). Virtually all foreign 
businesses in China depend on VPNs, 
and blocking them would unaccept-
ably impact commerce.
Chinese citizens also use vari-
ous proxy tools, including Garden 
Networks’ GTunnel (www.gardennet-
works.org), Psiphon (www.psiphon.
ca), and UltraSurf (www.ultrareach.
com). These products use a combi-
nation of proxies, encryption, and 
onion routing to offer anonymized 
and uncensored Web access.
If Web !ltering is easy to circum-
vent, then what purpose does it serve? 
In the case of China, the apparent 
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Figure 2. State-sponsored Web censoring. In many countries—in this case, Saudi 
Arabia—a user who requests a government-prohibited website is presented with a 
blockpage explaining that the site is disallowed. 
